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WHY  GRIDLOCK  MATTERS
Michael J. Gerhardt*
INTRODUCTION
A week before the 2012 presidential election, I had the opportunity to
speak with a former senator.  I asked him about gridlock.  I wondered what
he would say to my law students who had lost hope in the legislative process
because of the gridlock that defined the 112th Congress.  He told me that
they had good reason to have lost hope.  He said that he conceived of the
legislative process as a target; that the center of the target represented the
areas that were most important to the country and the likeliest ones in which
bipartisan agreement could be reached; and that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or “Affordable Care Act”),1 in which he said that
President Obama had invested so much time and capital, was on the periph-
ery, if not the outside, of the target.  He explained that the ACA exceeded
the scope of congressional power.  He explained that opposing the ACA
should be the top priority of legislators and citizens.  When I asked him what
issues were at the center of the target, he initially did not respond.  After I
politely pressed him for an answer, he eventually said that there was nothing
more important than opposing the health care bill.  For him, gridlock had
become a constitutional necessity.
The former senator’s position on gridlock is hardly unique.  Indeed,
more than a year before President Obama’s re-election, Antonin Scalia, the
longest serving justice on the current Supreme Court, told the Senate Judici-
ary Committee that, “Americans should learn to love gridlock . . . .  The fram-
ers (of the Constitution) would say, yes, ‘That’s exactly the way we set it up.
We wanted power contradicting power (to prevent) an excess of legisla-
tion.’”2  A few weeks after the 2012 presidential election, Justice Scalia
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1 Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
2 David G. Savage, Justice Scalia: Americans “Should Learn to Love Gridlock,” L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/05/news/la-pn-scalia-testifies-2011
1005 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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repeated the same message to a packed auditorium at Princeton University,
adding “God bless gridlock.”3
This kind of praise for gridlock, coupled with the fact that the last Con-
gress was the least productive in memory, has led many people—both before
and after the presidential election—to worry about whether gridlock has
become either a permanent fixture, or a reflection of a serious defect, in our
constitutional system.  Is the gridlock we have witnessed over the past two
years something to applaud, as Justice Scalia suggests, or does it reflect some
serious defect in the Constitution, the current composition of Congress, the
design of the legislative process, or some combination of these things?  To
what extent is gridlock not just a constitutional virtue but also a constitu-
tional necessity?  To what extent does fidelity to the Constitution require
embracing or rejecting gridlock?
While these and other similar questions motivated this symposium on
constitutional gridlock, I do not believe that they are the right questions to
ask.  The critical question is, however, not whether gridlock is a constitu-
tional necessity, virtue, or problem.  If gridlock protects minorities, can it not
also hurt them?  If gridlock actually is a good thing, does transcending it
produce harm?  What does overcoming gridlock signify?  Is it likely not the
case that the failure of gridlock means that legislators somehow have failed
minorities—or does it?  The glorification of gridlock misses the point, per-
haps deliberately so.  After all, the framers did not design a constitution in
which gridlock was the objective.  The Constitution makes gridlock both pos-
sible and inevitable, but the purpose of the Constitution is not merely to
allow gridlock.  In fact, the Constitution makes federal lawmaking difficult
but not impossible.  Justice Scalia is thus only half correct: We should appre-
ciate not only the salutary effects of gridlock but also its possible harms as
well as what it means to say, as Justice Arthur Goldberg famously said in
United States v. Mendoza-Martinez,4 that, “while the Constitution protects
against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”5  The most
important question is whether Justices Goldberg and Scalia can both be right
and, if so, how?
The purpose of this Article is to put constitutional gridlock in perspec-
tive.  It seeks to clarify both the values and the problems that gridlock can
foster or produce.  Perhaps most importantly, I seek to clarify not only why
(or when) gridlock can be a good thing but also the constitutional signifi-
cance of overcoming it.  I consider not only the possible benefits and costs of
gridlock but also the constitutional significance of the facts that, within a few
weeks of Justice Scalia’s praise of gridlock and not long before the day of
President Obama’s second inauguration, he and Congress had reached an
agreement to bypass the fiscal cliff, at least for a couple months, and Senate
leaders had forged a modest agreement to make filibustering of judicial
3 Caleb Kennedy, Scalia Defends Opposition to Gay Rights Position, THE DAILY
PRINCETONIAN (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/2012/12/10/32135/.
4 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
5 Id. at 160 (Goldberg, J.).
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nominations more difficult.  When gridlock fails, something else has been
achieved, something that we invest with the force of law.  The Constitution is
a blueprint for gridlock and for making law.
In Part I, I clarify the values and the difficulties that gridlock and its
transcendence might facilitate.  There is not just one kind of gridlock, nor is
there just one kind of benefit—or cost—to overcoming gridlock.  The values
of gridlock include protecting minorities and preserving the status quo and
some freedom from federal regulation.  The costs of gridlock are preventing
progress, hindering legal change, exacerbating divisiveness, and empowering
factions.  But, overcoming gridlock or approving legal change promotes
many values, including progress, solving social problems, and providing
social benefits.  Moreover, it achieves the usual benefits every time the legisla-
tive process works—deliberation, consensus, representativeness, and account-
ability.  Lawmaking might also be costly and be harmful in some ways,
including but not limited to social disruption and financial and other costs
that compliance with new laws requires.  The important thing to understand
is glib one-liners about the virtues of gridlock or overregulation should not
be mistaken for sophisticated or careful constitutional analysis.  It is impera-
tive that, in any discussion of gridlock in the legislative process, we need to
move away from polemics and precisely identify which values and which costs
are actually being promoted or produced in particular fights or areas of
lawmaking.
In Part II, I use three examples of conflicts in Congress to illustrate the
utility of a more nuanced understanding of gridlock.  These are the fights
over the Affordable Care Act, the filibuster, and the debt ceiling.  In each of
these instances, change in the status quo, even incrementally, was hard won.
They underscore the importance of not confusing the gridlock of the
moment with complete dysfunction.  They illustrate the different values—
and costs—of overcoming gridlock in both significant and incremental ways.
In Part III, I suggest two proposals for ameliorating more costly forms of
gridlock.  The first is to adopt the talking filibuster.  The filibuster has long
been a defining feature of the Senate.  Its increased use in recent years has
been costly to the image of the Senate, comity within the Senate, and the
efficient production of legislation and confirmation of presidential nomina-
tions, particularly to Article III courts.  The talking filibuster might make pro-
tracted delays on many issues more difficult to maintain, since it forces
senators to be visible and thus more likely to be accountable for delaying
various matters.  The second proposal is to seek judicial review of partisan
gerrymandering, which has facilitated divided government and provided a
basis for gridlock in lawmaking.  Overcoming partisan gerrymandering
requires the intervention of courts, but if courts were to eliminate gerryman-
dering on this basis it could make it easier for voters to turn out legislators
whenever they are not producing the kinds of actions that voters actually
prefer.  But, if voters prefer gridlock, they could still vote for it even without
partisan gerrymandering.  Its elimination simply allows voters more opportu-
nities to vote on the substance of issues.
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I conclude that both protestations about gridlock and the praise for it
are overdone.  Even a dialogue about gridlock is progress.  It is better to
understand why we are at an impasse, the values that it might foster, the costs
it might incur, and the benefits and costs of transcending gridlock than sim-
ply to throw up our hands in disgust or consternation.  Indeed, if we better
understand why gridlock can be good, we will be in a better position to recog-
nize the costs of gridlock when it is bad.
I. ASSESSING GRIDLOCK AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
In a symposium focusing on gridlock, a good place to begin is with an
understanding of gridlock.  The temptation to oversimplify gridlock is
strong.  But, if we understand why gridlock can be good, we can appreciate
the values, or positive outcomes or consequences, it facilitates.  At the same
time, we can appreciate and assess when it goes awry or produces the dysfunc-
tion my friend Josh Chafetz describes in his contribution to this Symposium.6
In this Part, I offer a more nuanced account of gridlock and the legislative
process than proponents and critics of gridlock often provide.  I briefly
describe the principal kinds of gridlock, their benefits and costs, and the
possible values and costs when gridlock is overcome, i.e., when the lawmak-
ing process works.
The principal kind of gridlock is structural gridlock.  Both the constitu-
tional design and the design of Congress allow for—indeed, anticipate—
many more ways in which lawmaking may be stopped than achieved.  These
impediments or complications are called veto-gates7 or the myriad paths by
which laws can fail to be approved.  Structural gridlock is reflected in numer-
ous counter-majoritarian features of the Constitution, all of which require
the participation of more than one branch in the alteration of the status quo.
These features include the lawmaking process requiring participation of the
House, the Senate, and the President (or overriding the President by super-
majorities in both the House and the Senate);8 judicial review; the impeach-
ment process depending on the division of authority between the House and
the Senate;9 the appointment process requiring presidential nomination and
Senate approval;10 treaty ratification requiring at least two-thirds approval of
the Senate;11 and the appropriations process, which must begin in the
House.12
Moreover, Article I, Section 5 empowers each chamber of Congress to
adopt internal rules of governance, including but not limited to requiring
6 See generally Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. __
(2013) (discussing the institutional “dysfunction” that may arise from legislative inaction).
7 See William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1,
2–6 (2012).
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
9 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I § 3, cls. 6–7.
10 Id. art. II § 2, cl. 2.
11 Id.
12 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
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committees (at least generally) to approve bills in order for them to reach
the floor for final votes in the House or Senate.13  It is nearly impossible for a
bill to become a law if the relevant committee in the House or Senate does
not approve it.  There are also many procedural requirements that bills or
other legislative initiatives must satisfy in order to be voted on in committees.
Committee chairs generally control the timing of hearings, including
whether there are any hearings on pending legislative business.  Committee
chairs also control the numbers of witnesses as well as whether or when their
committees may vote on pending legislative business.  A bill or other legisla-
tive initiative simply fails if it never manages to satisfy each and every proce-
dural requirement of the House and Senate for lawmaking.
The other kind of gridlock is substantive.  This is simply when, for
whatever reason (including partisanship), the members in the House or sen-
ators cannot agree on a law or substantive matter or the President disagrees
with Congress over the substance of a bill.
These various structural features of the Constitution reflect important
values and veto-gates, which we must understand in any thorough analysis of
constitutional gridlock.  Substantive impasse might also reflect certain values,
depending on the nature of the disagreement and the specific effects of the
failure to reach agreement.
To begin with, one benefit of structural gridlock is, as Justice Scalia sug-
gested, that minorities are not subjected to regulation.14  The minorities to
which he refers are political, i.e., defined by their opposition to some regula-
tory scheme or their preference to preserve the current legal regime (includ-
ing non-regulation).  Moreover, the failure of Congress to legislate inures to
the benefit of federalism, particularly to the States.  As the Supreme Court
declared in Gregory v. Ashcroft,15 state and federal governments “will act as
mutual restraints only if both are credible.  In the tension between federal
and state power lies the promise of liberty.”16  As also emphasized by the
Court, the framers recognized further benefits to the federalist structure of
the Constitution:
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive
by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.17
When Congress fails to act, States are left with more room or opportu-
nity to regulate a matter that potentially has had some interstate ramifica-
tions.  The failure of Congress to regulate protects people and institutions
from the costs of regulation.
13 See id. art. I, § 5.
14 See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. R
15 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
16 Id. at 459.
17 Id. at 458.
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But, the effect of gridlock might not be purely salutary.  Nor is it strictly
true that gridlock means a void or complete absence of any legislative action.
At the very least, gridlock leaves in place the legal status quo.  Whatever
problems or difficulties Congress failed to address remain in place.  These
could be rather extensive, including but not limited to discrimination or
health and environmental risks.  Hence, gridlock might actually allow certain
factions to preserve their privileged status as well as certain minorities to con-
tinue to be subjected to inequitable or unfair treatment.
Moreover, when gridlock fails, does it necessarily follow that minorities
will suffer?  When the lawmaking process works, something more than just a
law is approved.  When gridlock fails and the system produces some positive
outcome(s), it is not constitutionally insignificant.
In fact, legislative action that satisfies Article I’s lawmaking requirements
promotes five values.  First, they reflect consensus.  If a bill is approved by a
majority in the House and the Senate and signed by the President, it obvi-
ously must command a fairly widespread degree of support from elected
representatives.
Second, satisfying Article I’s requirements for lawmaking reflects delib-
eration.  In order for something to become a law, it must overcome or bypass
numerous veto-gates.18  A law is unlikely to achieve approval without careful
scrutiny.  The scrutiny the law is likely to receive in committee and on the
floor as well as in the White House is bound to be relatively rigorous.  The
more important the law the more likely it will be that there will be careful
scrutiny and deliberation over its substance and legality.
The third value that satisfying Article I’s procedural safeguards effectu-
ates is representativeness.  The approval of a law will require a significant
extent of support from the nation’s representatives.  A small faction of
lawmakers lacks the power to make laws.  Lawmaking requires the approval
of most representatives in the House and most senators and thus, in all likeli-
hood, the support of the people that these representatives and senators
represent.
The fourth value that satisfying Article I’s lawmaking requirements facili-
tates is accountability.  Approval requires a public action, and the people who
support or approve a law must be accountable for their approval and
support.
The final value of satisfying Article I’s lawmaking requirements is a
change in the legal status that inures to the benefit of an oppressed minority
or provides for some incremental (if not more significant) solution to a socie-
tal problem.  For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act, signed into
law by President George H. W. Bush, provided for certain beneficial treat-
ments for persons with disabilities on a scale previously unseen, or exper-
ienced, in the United States.19  While many businesses were challenged with
18 See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 2-6. R
19 Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2006)).
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some greater expenses, thousands of disabled American workers experienced
greater ease, or confronted fewer burdens, in the workplace.
But, enacting laws might not have purely salutary, or beneficial, effects.
It is likely that a law might produce, require, or engender some costs.  First,
as we have already noted, enacting a law changes the legal status quo.20  In
some cases, it can produce social disruption.  There is no question, for exam-
ple, that the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 symbolized progress
and achieved important legal change and important protection of racial
minorities.21  At the same time, the change effected was not easy for some
parts or segments of society to accept or follow.  The same is undoubtedly
true for the Affordable Care Act22 or perhaps with any major piece of
legislation.
Second, a law’s enactment is likely to require some institutional costs.  A
new regulatory regime might have to be constructed, and this could cost
money.  Moreover, compliance with the law could cost businesses or individ-
ual citizens money either in implementing procedural mechanisms to ensure
compliance or fines. In other words, the enforcement could require busi-
nesses or individuals to incur costs.  Consider, for example, a new environ-
mental law.  It could produce a cleaner environment, but it also requires
government enforcement mechanisms to be implemented, and it requires
businesses to invest in technology to avoid pollution for which they could be
fined or potentially shut down.
What emerges from this analysis is a recognition that the lawmaking pro-
cess, whether it works or not, is likely to produce complicated results.  The
rejection of a law is not necessarily an unqualified positive.  Legally, gridlock
signifies nothing, as suggested by other contributors to the Symposium.23
But, there might be costs to inaction that should not be ignored.  Because
nothing changing the legal status quo is a result of gridlock, it is easy for
observers or commentators to read into it almost anything (and any values)
they want.  At the same time, the approval of a law is likely to reflect various
values and possibly incur some costs.  Changing the status quo is unlikely to
be cost-free, but then gridlock is also unlikely to be cost-free.  In the next
Part, I examine three areas of recent congressional conflict to illustrate not
20 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. R
21 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h-6 (2006)).
22 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
23 See Chafetz, supra note 6, at __(“[G]ridlock is the absence of phenomena; it is the R
absence, that is, of legislative action.”); Gerard N. Magliocca, Don’t Be So Impatient, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. __, __ (2013) (“The right not to agree is fundamental.  Though there
are costs to congressional paralysis and filibuster reform is essential to protect the major-
ity’s right to legislate, aggressive action to transcend partisan divisions in the country would
be unwise.”); John C. Roberts, Gridlock and Senate Rules, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. __, __
(2013) (“I am tempted to declare the symposium over by arguing that there are no such
relevant legal issues . . . .  But that would be too easy.  There are legal defects . . . even if we
may conclude that they are symptoms and not causes of gridlock.”).
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just the costs, which have been played up in the media a good deal, but also
the benefits that are likely to accrue both in the short- and long-terms.
II. THE VALUE OF OVERCOMING GRIDLOCK
For all the praise and handwringing over gridlock, it is useful to consider
the constitutional significance of overcoming it.  Josh Chafetz has identified
the prerequisites for legislative action and suggested ways in which to identify
or measure dysfunction within our present scheme of lawmaking.24
In this Part, I suggest an inquiry that is complimentary to his.  In particu-
lar, I discuss three examples of recent conflicts within Congress—the Afford-
able Care Act, the debt ceiling, and the filibuster—to illustrate what national
leaders both gain—and lose—overcoming gridlock.  In each of these
instances, there was gridlock for a while (sometimes for quite a long while)
and then some degree of legal change was achieved.  Appreciating the nature
and value of this change is critical for putting constitutional gridlock in the
proper perspective.
The first is the Affordable Care Act,25 which reflected the convergence
of structural and partisan gridlock.  It is among the many significant legisla-
tive achievements of the first two years of Barack Obama’s presidency, includ-
ing but not limited to the auto industry rescue,26 reform of financial
regulations,27 and the appointments of Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan to
the Supreme Court.28  Try as they might, the opponents of this law tried to
stop it in every sphere in which it arose—the Senate and the House, in which
it eventually passed; the President, who introduced the plan in his State of
the Union and then urged it before a joint session of Congress, signed it into
law, and was subsequently challenged unsuccessfully for reelection;29 and the
courts, which ultimately upheld most of the law, including its most controver-
sial provision.30  The ultimate passage of this law and its ratification (if not
24 See Chafetz, supra note 6, at ___. R
25 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
26 See Times Topics: Auto Industry Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/auto_industry/index.
html (summarizing the auto industry collapse and the governmental response, as well as
compiling links to additional articles on the topic).
27 See Times Topics: Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011), http://top-
ics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regula-
tory_reform/index.html (chronicling the Obama administration and Congress’s response
to the financial and credit crises).
28 See Charlie Savage, Sotomayor Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/us/politics/09sotomayor.html?_r=0 (detail-
ing the swearing in of Justice Sotomayor); Carl Hulse, Senate Confirms Kagan in Partisan
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/us/politics/
06kagan.html (covering the Senate confirmation of Justice Kagan).
29 See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Obama Takes Key Battlegrounds to Win Re-election, CNN (Nov. 7,
2012 5:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/06/politics/election-2012.
30 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding the Afford-
able Care Act).
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vindication) in every phase of the legislative process demonstrates the impor-
tant fact that this process is not necessarily meant to be fatal but instead con-
stitutes a crucible that tests a law’s legitimacy.  The Affordable Care Act is a
reminder that the veto-gates sanctioned by the Constitution are not supposed
to be fatal in every instance and that a law that passes through them all is
likely to reflect the values that the framers established the legislative process
to facilitate.
The persistent complaints about the Affordable Care Act should not
dilute the important fact that the law’s passage (and later approval in almost
all of its entirety by the Court) reflects its realization of the values the framers
expected enactments to reflect.  First, it was the product of intense delibera-
tion in Congress and the media.  Second, its enactment reflects widespread
consensus among the members of Congress.  A law’s enactment will never be
the product of unanimous agreement among the members of Congress, but
the fact that most members of both the House and Senate approved the bill
reflects its widespread support across national leaders and representatives.
Third, its enactment reflects significant representativeness.  People charged
with representing Americans around the country largely supported the law.
Fourth, everyone who voted for or against the law stood for reelection.  Vot-
ers had the opportunities to express their support or disapproval of the law
both in the midterm elections of 2010 and the presidential election of 2012.
The outcomes suggest that the public largely supports the health care
overhaul.
It bears repeating that the fact that the persistency and obstinacy of com-
plaints about the Affordable Care Act do not diminish the constitutional sig-
nificance of its approval in Congress and the upholding of its most
controversial provision by the Supreme Court.  Overcoming gridlock usually
requires all three branches to fall behind a law.  Once the efforts to stop a law
have failed, it is appropriate to consider what has been achieved.  At that
point, there is progress, and the principal remaining costs are those associ-
ated with the implementation of the law.  These might not be small, but they
will also not arise in a vacuum.  Any costs will be incurred for the sake of
providing broadening access to health care and lowering its costs generally.
The constitutional dialogue about the law’s legitimacy will continue, but it
must now be informed by the benefits and the costs entailed by the law’s
overcoming gridlock.
Another example of overcoming gridlock is the last minute detail to
avert falling off the fiscal cliff in early January 2013.31  Of course, failing to fix
the debt ceiling could have been financially catastrophic.  But, the overcom-
ing of gridlock on the final day of the last Congress suggests that perhaps this
last Congress might not have been as completely gridlocked as many pundits
suggested.  More importantly, the law signed by President Obama, just weeks
before his second inauguration, reflects the same values that congressionally
31 Matt Smith, Obama Signs Bill Warding Off Fiscal Cliff, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 3, 2013,
2:17 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/02/politics/fiscal-cliff/index.html.
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approved legislation generally reflects.  The deal was not struck in secret and
was, however imperfect, at least not a victim of gridlock.  Indeed, gridlock on
this important issue should have been no surprise, because of both the cum-
bersome requirements for lawmaking (which are likely to be more cumber-
some the more important the issue) and the substantive differences among
the members of Congress over the important issues involved.  Overcoming
gridlock was not easy, especially for a Congress pilloried for its dysfunction.
Overcoming gridlock on this issue differed from the health care overhaul in
that it was not grand in scope; it was an incremental, temporary solution to a
legislative problem.  Such solutions are not unique, but reflect all the same
values that approved legislation generally reflects—deliberation, representa-
tiveness, accountability, and consensus.  These benefits outweigh, at least in
the judgments of most members of Congress and the President, the costs
emanating from the short-term solution.
The final example to consider is the filibuster.  Much has been said
about the use of the filibuster to obstruct judicial nominations and other
compelling business in the Senate.  Critics have loudly complained that
Republicans in the 112th Congress abused the filibuster to delay judicial
nominations, which actually enjoyed the support of more than a majority in
the Senate.32  In the 2012 elections, at least one Senate candidate (Angus
King, Democrat from Maine) ran successfully on a platform to reform the
filibuster,33 and in the weeks between the 2012 presidential election and the
first day of the 113th Congress, senators worked furiously behind closed
doors to reach some meaningful accord over the use of filibusters to block
presidential nominations, particularly nominations to Article III courts.  Four
days after President Obama’s second inaugural, Senate leaders reached a
modest agreement to limit the filibuster’s deleterious effects by providing for
“two new expedited options for bringing legislation to the floor” of the Sen-
ate for a final vote.34
The modesty of the reform adopted should not in any way diminish the
significance of its having been achieved.  First, the debate within the Senate
over the reform was significant because it refined the institution’s considera-
tion of the effects of such reform.  The debate reflected senators’ widespread
recognition of the institutional and constitutional issues at stake.  It reflected
32 See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez, Senate Republican Filibuster Blocks Obama D.C. Circuit Nominee
Caitlin Halligan, WASH. POST POLITICS (Dec. 6, 2011, 2:35 PM), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/senate-republican-filibuster-blocks-obama-dc-cir-
cuit-nominee-caitlin-halligan/2011/12/06/gIQAtp6nZO_blog.html (discussing how,
despite fifty-four votes in favor of ending debate, the nomination of Caitlin Halligan was
blocked from going to a vote).
33 See, e.g., Mark Trumbull, Angus King Wins.  Maine Sends New Voice of Moderation to
Senate, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elec-
tions/Senate/2012/1106/Angus-King-wins.-Maine-sends-new-voice-of-moderation-to-Sen-
ate (listing filibuster reform to combat “stalled progress” as one of King’s campaign goals).
34 Niels Lesniewski, Filibuster Changes Get Senate Approval, ROLL CALL NEWS (Jan. 24,
2013), 8:53 PM) http://www.rollcall.com/news/filibuster_changes_get_senate_approval-
221072-1.html.
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their awareness of the institutional costs of implementing a solution by a slim
majority of the Senate.  These costs include, most importantly, the possibility
of blowing up the Senate.  Having fifty-one senators agree to formally amend-
ing the rules (contrary to the supermajority that the rules require) would be
unprecedented.  Many senators were concerned that proceeding in this man-
ner opened the door to enabling a majority to disregard the rules of the
Senate whenever it suited their purposes.  Such disregard would effectively
render the rules of the Senate meaningless; they would only matter when a
majority wanted them to matter.  It appeared that there was a generational
divide within the Senate, with newer senators more disposed to amend the
rules in this radical fashion and longer serving senators disposed to protect
the longstanding rules and norms of the Senate even at the risk of making
their lives more difficult at least in the short term.
Senators understood that amending the rules in this manner undoubt-
edly ran the risk of provoking the minority to take retaliatory actions, such as
denying unanimous consent to do other critical business in the Senate.
Amending the rules in the Senate by majority vote also would make the Sen-
ate more like the House, in which a majority determines virtually everything
of importance within the institution.  For many senators, particularly those
who had served in the Senate for a long time, the Senate’s distinctive feature
was that everyone shared the same degree of authority in contrast to the
House in which someone who belonged to the minority effectively had no
power.
Moreover, the debate reflected senators’ concerns about the constitu-
tionality of allowing a majority to amend the Senate rules.  Proponents of
such a change maintained that a majority was constitutionally entitled to
change the rules as it saw fit and that, any rule or practice depriving of them
of the opportunity, was unconstitutional.  They argued that any requirement
that rules could be amended only by a supermajority of the Senate deprived
the current members of the Senate the power to change their own rules.
They viewed that adherence to the rules of the Senate entrenched the prefer-
ences of a prior generation, which was no longer living or in power.
The fact that the actual agreement was modest in scope was not a victory
for gridlock.  Achieving any kind of solution, however incremental, was no
small feat given the intensity (and complexity) of the issues involved.  It was
not insignificant because, at the very least, it underscores the nature of our
legislative process.  The Constitution does not establish a parliamentary sys-
tem at the federal level.  Under such a system, voters expect—and the system
allows for—the legislative body to implement their preferred legislative pri-
orities.  The legislative process set forth in the Constitution was not designed
to be efficient or effective.  The failure of a legislative initiative, or gridlock, is
always more likely in our legislative process than its approval or passage.
Hence, it should not be terribly surprising when incremental change, even in
the Senate rules, fails.  It is more telling when senators choose to follow their
own rules and only to change them in accordance with the procedures for
amendment that they provide.  In spite of our recent gridlock, it is not insig-
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nificant that senators have actually amended, or approved reforms to, the
filibuster on several occasions throughout our history.  A gang of fourteen
senators in 2005 averted the so-called “nuclear option” by forging an agree-
ment on the extraordinary circumstances in which they would allow filibus-
ters of judicial nominations.35  These kinds of agreements are not unusual,
even in the present era of bitter partisanship.  To agree to incremental
change is a defeat for gridlock; it demonstrates the extent to which senators
can reach imperfect but still positive solutions to difficult procedural ques-
tions.  In this instance, the solution preserved the rules and underscored the
extent to which comity within the Senate is a significant feature of the institu-
tion but allowed for a change that decreased the likelihood of gridlock over
legislation in the 113th Congress.
III. FURTHER FIXING GRIDLOCK
In this Part, I suggest two possible reforms to reduce some of the more
frustrating gridlock that occurred in the 112th Congress, particularly the
obstruction and inordinate delays of judicial nominations.  Neither is meant
to minimize the incremental steps taken in the 113th Congress to reform the
filibuster and to enact legislation addressing the debt ceiling.  Nonetheless,
one significant, long overdue reform is to reduce the opportunities to use the
filibuster to obstruct floor votes on a wide range of legislative issues.  The
most meaningful reform of the filibuster is to require what is called “the talk-
ing filibuster.”36  The present scheme dates back to 1975 when Senate Major-
ity Leader Mike Mansfield created the two-track system in which he could
remove from floor consideration any item of business on which one or more
senators have threatened to filibuster.37  This scheme has allowed business to
be delayed without any debate.  Instead, senators should be required what
they were obliged to do prior to 1975—namely, to be forced openly to
defend their obstruction and preferences for delay in front of the galleries,
the media, and the American people.38
The advantages of this reform should be obvious.  At the very least, it
requires senators to engage in a public opposition of the business they wish
to filibuster.  In doing so, they can be held more easily politically accountable
for their obstruction.  Moreover, holding the floor requires that they be able
35 See Michael Gerhardt & Richard Painter, “Extraordinary Circumstances”: The Legacy of
the Gang of 14 and a Proposal for Judicial Nominations Reform, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 969, 974
(2012).
36 Dylan Matthews, Sen. Jeff Merkley’s Talking Filibuster: How it Would Work, WASH. POST
(Dec. 13, 2012, 12:47 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/
12/13/sen-jeff-merkleys-talking-filibuster-how-it-would-work/.
37 Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 200–02
(1997) (discussing the Stealth Filibuster from 1970 to the 1990’s).
38 See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 120–23 (2008) (dis-
cussing majority rule in the Senate).
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to maintain the support of at least a significant minority within the Senate.39
In the absence of this support, they would have to relinquish the floor, and
the obstructed item(s) would be allowed to come before the full Senate for a
vote.40
The second reform is to do away with partisan gerrymandering.  For over
a decade, the Supreme Court has avoided deciding whether partisan gerry-
mandering poses a non-justiciable question.41  The difficulty is that partisan
gerrymandering allows one party to redraw district-voting lines within a State
to protect its incumbents and aggrandize itself at the expense of the other.
Some recent data suggests that such gerrymandering allows one party to
maintain power even when statewide it might be losing in other elections.42
One is hard pressed to explain why the Constitution protects such ploys.
Moreover, partisan gerrymandering is not protected by the First Amend-
ment, which cannot be used to privilege one party’s expression over that of
another.43  The point of partisan gerrymandering is to privilege the political
power (or voice) of one political party over another, which seems to conflict
directly with the guarantee of the First Amendment to ensure that govern-
ment does not silence or dilute the expression of a political point of view.  To
the contrary, partisan gerrymandering is the process by which one party seeks
to diminish or even silence the political speech of its competitor.  Just as
judicial review is available to assess the constitutionality of racial gerryman-
dering,44 it should prevent one faction, particularly one defined by its exer-
cise of First Amendment rights, from dominating another, which is defined
by similar means.
Making it much more difficult to effectuate partisan gerrymandering
should serve the same ends as the Supreme Court’s restrictions of racial ger-
rymandering.  The latter only passes muster if it satisfies strict scrutiny.45
Otherwise, it likely risks being based on stereotypes or overgeneralizations.
On my view, partisan gerrymandering should not be treated any differently.
It too should be subject to strict scrutiny based as it is on the exercise of First
39 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 240 (noting that the law requires a sixty R
percent supermajority in the event of a filibuster).
40 See Matthews, supra note 36. R
41 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 138 (1986) (plurality opinion).
42 See Sam Wang, Op-Ed, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0  (“To see how the [gerrymandering] works, start with the naı̈ve
standard that the party that wins more than half the votes should get at least half the seats.
In November, five states failed to clear even this low bar: Arizona, Michigan, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.”).
43 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (examining whether the State
engaged in unconstitutional political gerrymandering).
45 See Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerryman-
dering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1538 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme
Court should hold racial and political gerrymandering per se unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Amendment expression.46  Partisan gerrymandering should be barred in
order to ensure state legislatures ground their line drawing of congressional
districts on permissible, rather than constitutionally impermissible, bases.
CONCLUSION
Grappling with gridlock requires understanding both its benefits and
costs.  On the positive side, it can ensure the maintenance of the status quo
and protect minorities (and many other citizens) from regulation generally
and particularly over-regulation, including the costs (or burdens) of imple-
menting or complying with new laws.  But, its costs include inhibiting or
impeding progress, allowing entrenched interests to maintain their privi-
leged status, and permitting some injustice or inequity to persist.
Moreover, grappling with gridlock requires adjusting perspective.
Understanding gridlock requires placing it in perspective.  Broadening per-
spective allows us to appreciate that gridlock has often gripped our political
system but it has rarely done so permanently.  The history books are replete
with instances in which, in one area or another, Congress—or other actors in
our constitutional system—may have been gridlocked for a time, perhaps
even a long time, in a particular area or on a particular matter, but the
gridlock was not permanent.
Indeed, for those who have lost heart over constitutional gridlock, I sug-
gest that the publication of our program at the Notre Dame Law Review is not
insignificant.  I say take heart from the ongoing vitality of the University of
Notre Dame as an institution and its embrace of Catholicity.  In a world that
most of us at one time or another in recent times has said has lost its way, I
suggest that gridlock is almost certainly a temporary condition.  If you take a
broader perspective, you will not only see that gridlock is not a permanent
feature of the human condition or the American dream.  More than a cen-
tury ago, no one would have believed there could be an African-American
president, and Catholic bias and anti-Semitism were rampant.  Yet, today if
you take the long view, you can take heart from the fact that less than two
weeks ago we re-elected the nation’s first African-American president, and
there are six Catholics and three Jews who sit on the nation’s highest Court.
No one would have believed that was possible more than a century ago.
More than a century ago, we would have been mired in the gridlock of
prejudice.  But, in time, the gridlock eroded, and in its place we achieved
something we all call progress.
46 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
